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The damage from today’s mortgage foreclosure 
crisis reaches deep into the rental market. With 
affordability already a long-standing problem, 
the current housing debacle not only adds 
to the number of households competing for 
low-cost rentals and threatens current renters 
with eviction from their homes, but also increases 
the costs of financing rental housing construction 
and preservation. Moreover, because many 
high-risk loans now in default are concentrated 
in low-income and minority communities, 
the fallout from foreclosures is hitting the same 
neighborhoods where many of the nation’s 
most economically vulnerable renters live. 
THE MORTGAGE MARKET MELTDOWN
Soaring foreclosure rates are one of the unintended side 
effects of extending homeownership opportunities to higher-
risk households with limited incomes and wealth. Designed 
to expand access to mortgage capital for these borrowers, 
subprime lending helped to fuel the decade-long homebuying 
boom. But as early as 2004, the number of subprime loans 
that were seriously delinquent (with payments 60 days or 
more late, and/or just entering into foreclosure) had jumped 
to over 260,000, devastating many low-income and minor-
ity communities—particularly in the industrial Midwest. But 
because the performance of prime loans remained relatively 
stable, the uptick in troubled subprime mortgages had little 
impact on national mortgage markets. 
But as more and more households struggled to buy in the face 
of rapidly rising home prices, the number of seriously delin-
quent conventional mortgages continued to climb—more 
than doubling from 2004 to 2007 to well over 1.3 million 
(Figure 1). Various forms of nontraditional and higher-priced 
subprime loans were particularly vulnerable. The Mortgage 
Bankers Association estimates that over 12 percent (or some 
750,000) of all subprime loans were seriously delinquent 
by the end of 2007. Although the share of troubled prime 
mortgages was only 1.67 percent at year end, this translates 
into nearly 580,000 seriously delinquent loans—an increase of 
143 percent from the 2004 figure.
Aggressive marketing by many mortgage industry partici-
pants helped to spark the meteoric rise in high-risk products. 
Reinforcing this trend was the structure of the mortgage 
industry itself—in particular Wall Street’s seemingly insatiable 
appetite for mortgage-backed securities and the widespread 
use of incentives for brokers and loan officers to push risky, 
higher-priced products. The surge in foreclosures suggests 
that many borrowers who took on subprime loans and other 
forms of high-priced debt had little or no capacity to repay.
The plentiful supply of mortgage capital also fed a substantial 
rise in high-risk lending to absentee owners of one- to four-
I N T R O D U C T I O N  A N D  S U M M A R Y 
Note: Numbers equal four-quarter moving average of non-seasonally adjusted conventional loans serviced, 
multiplied by the seasonally adjusted rates of delinquencies and foreclosure starts.
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.
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unit rental properties. The Mortgage Bankers Association 
reports that, by the end of 2007, one out of every five new 
foreclosure actions nationwide involved absentee owners of 
such properties. While varying from one state to the next, the 
foreclosure process generally overrides existing rental lease 
provisions. As a result, even tenants with strong payment 
histories may be forced to move from their homes with little 
or no notice. 
THE RENTAL AFFORDABILITY CRISIS
While some owners who have lost their homes will quickly 
buy another unit and others will move in with family and 
friends, many will become renters. Indeed, after averaging just 
0.7 percent annual growth from 2003 to 2006, the number 
of renter households jumped by 2.8 percent or nearly one 
million in 2007.
The growing numbers of renters must now compete for the 
limited supply of affordable housing, adding to the long-
standing pressures in markets across the country. Each year 
the National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) cal-
culates the current “housing wage,” or the amount it takes 
to afford a modest two-bedroom apartment at 30 percent of 
income. In 2007, that figure stood at $16.31 an hour, nearly 
three times today’s minimum wage of $5.85 and over twice 
the $7.25 level scheduled to go into effect in 2009.
National figures of course mask sharp differences in afford-
ability across states. Nevertheless, no single minimum-wage 
earner working 40 hours a week, 52 weeks a year, earns 
enough to cover the cost of a modest rental anywhere in the 
country (Figure 2). Even in rural counties where rents may be as 
low as $500, a full-time worker would have to earn up to two 
times the minimum wage to afford a basic two-bedroom unit. 
Meanwhile, in some of the highest-cost areas where rents 
exceed $1,500 per month, a household would have to include 
more than five full-time minimum-wage workers to cover the 
cost of a modest apartment. 
Housing Wage
■ 1–2 Times the Minimum Wage
■ 2–3 Times the Minimum Wage
■ 3 or More Times the Minimum Wage
Notes: The housing wage is the income required to afford a modest two-bedroom apartment at the local fair market rent, assuming the household pays 30% of income for housing and works 40 hours a week 
for 52 weeks. The federal minimum wage in February 2008 was $5.85 per hour. Analysis is based on methodology developed by Cushing N. Dolbeare and the National Low Income Housing Coalition.
Source: US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fiscal Year 2008 Fair Market Rents.
One Minimum-Wage Earner Cannot Afford a Modest Rental Unit Anywhere in the Country
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SUPPLY PRESSURES
Rising foreclosures and the resulting turmoil in credit markets 
threaten to undermine the already weak multifamily construc-
tion sector. Last year, completions of multifamily units for 
rent fell to 169,000 units—just two-thirds of the 2002 figure 
and only one-third of the 1986 record high (Table A-1). Today, 
with the cost of capital to fund new multifamily construction 
on the rise and a possible recession in the offing, the near-
term prospects for this sector remain bleak.
In the short run, it also appears that mortgage foreclosures 
are adding to the number of units held off the market—in 
part because of the long foreclosure disposition process, and 
in part because some new owners of foreclosed properties are 
waiting for conditions to improve before putting their units 
back on the market (Figure 3). At the same time, the weak 
homebuying market is also helping to expand the supply 
of higher-priced rentals as owners attempt to rent out their 
newly vacant condominiums and single-family homes. But 
because most renters do not have adequate income to take 
advantage of these opportunities, the market has limited abil-
ity to absorb the current excess supply. 
 
With these large, unprecedented shifts on both the demand 
and supply sides of the rental market, the direction of rents 
is impossible to predict. On the one hand, rent levels were 
still climbing through the end of 2007. Indeed, monthly 
gross rents (payments to property owners plus utility costs) 
stood at a record high of $775 last year in inflation-adjusted 
terms (Table A-2). While former homeowners with good 
income-earning prospects may be able to manage rents of this 
magnitude, over 15 million lowest-income renters cannot. 
With incomes of less than $24,200, these households would 
have to spend at least 38 percent of their incomes to afford 
rents of $775 a month, and many would have to spend 
a much higher percentage. 
On the other hand, just as the foreclosure crisis is pushing 
down home prices, rising rental vacancy rates could trigger 
a decline in rents. Indeed, the excess supply could eventually 
filter down to lowest-income renters. This would, however, 
provide a temporary fix at best. When property owners are 
unable to collect rents sufficient to cover basic maintenance 
and operating costs, they are likely to leave their properties 
vacant for long periods—the first step toward abandonment 
and demolition. 
THREATS TO LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
The foreclosure crisis is hitting the nation’s low-income and 
minority neighborhoods particularly hard. According to the 
most recent Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, 
higher-cost subprime loans accounted for 27 percent of all 
home loan originations in 2006, but nearly 45 percent of 
those in low-income, predominantly minority communities. 
By comparison, higher-priced subprime loans represented just 
15 percent of all home mortgages in high-income, predomi-
nantly white areas (Table A-8).
Little wonder, then, that foreclosures are also concentrated 
in low-income and minority communities. Assuming that a
higher-priced subprime loan is 10 times more likely than 
a lower-priced prime loan to end in foreclosure (a fairly 
conservative ratio), loans on homes in low-income minority 
neighborhoods are 48 percent more likely to be foreclosed 
than loans on average, and two times more likely than loans 
in high-income white areas (Figure 4). 
High levels of foreclosures produce collateral damage that can 
easily destabilize already vulnerable communities. In particu-
lar, the concentration of foreclosures in lower-income, dense-
ly populated neighborhoods works to depress property values, 
lower local property tax revenue, and impose additional costs 
on cash-strapped public agencies that must pay for police, fire, 
and other municipal services to prevent the blighting effect of 
vacant properties. 
Foreclosures Have Added Significantly 
to the Vacant Inventory
Thousands
FIGURE 3
2003 2006 2007
Average Annual 
  Percent Change
2003–06 2006–07
Occupied 105,560 109,575 110,306 1.3 0.7
Own 72,054 75,380 75,159 1.5 -0.3
Rent 33,506 34,195 35,147 0.7 2.8
Year-Round Vacant 11,631 12,459 13,276 2.3 6.6
For Rent 3,676 3,737 3,848 0.5 3.0
For Sale 1,308 1,836 2,117 12.0 15.3
Held Off Market 5,672 5,778 6,181 0.6 7.0
Seasonal Vacant 3,643 3,978 4,376 3.0 10.0
Source: US Census Bureau, 2003–2007 Housing Vacancy Survey. 
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NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY 
Rates of early payment delinquencies are a widely used indica-
tor of how a set of loans is likely to perform over time. Based 
on an analysis of loans that are currently 60 days or more late, 
most industry experts predict loans originated in 2006 and 
2007 will be the most foreclosure-prone in history. 
Of course, quick and aggressive policy action could limit 
future growth in foreclosures and help financially distressed 
homeowners pull back from the brink. Yet even as mortgage 
industry executives, government officials, and nonprofit and 
community leaders work to find remedies to the mortgage 
market meltdown, the number of foreclosures continues to 
climb. Left unchecked, loan foreclosures are likely to continue 
to rise well into 2009.
While crafting appropriate solutions to assist homeowners 
facing foreclosure is an important national goal, the mortgage 
market crisis should not divert attention from the urgent 
housing problems that low-income renters confront. As the 
mortgage market turmoil continues, many holders of fore-
closed assets will be forced to sell at deep discounts. Rather 
than allow foreclosed properties be sold off to the highest 
bidder, what is needed is a mission-driven entity, such as a 
community preservation fund, that could participate in this 
market with the goal of expanding the supply of affordable 
rental housing. 
Crafting such a program could be the centerpiece of the next 
generation of affordable housing programs—a balanced set 
of national housing policy initiatives that expand access to 
sustainable and affordable housing opportunities to meet the 
needs of owners and renters alike.
Notes: Loans are ﬁrst lien mortgages originated for owner-occupied, one- to four-unit properties. Low- (middle-/high-) income neighborhoods are deﬁned as census tracts with less than 80% (80–120%/more 
than 120%) of the MSA/MD median income. Minority neighborhoods are more than 50% minority; mixed neighborhoods are 10–50% minority; and white neighborhoods are less than 10% minority.
Source: JCHS tabulations of 2000 Decennial Census and 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.
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Renter households are becoming more diverse 
not only because of the growing numbers 
of immigrants and minorities, but also because 
of the changing age structure of the population. 
Meanwhile, the income and wealth disparity 
between owners and renters has expanded, 
especially after many upper-income renters were 
enticed into buying during the recent homeownership 
boom. The current rash of foreclosures will, however, 
force some owners to switch back to renting. 
How these long- and short-term trends play out 
will affect the strength of future renter demand 
and the response of the rental stock. 
THE SHIFTING COMPOSITION OF DEMAND
Over the decade from 1995 to 2005, the number of renter 
households increased by just 2.6 million while the number of 
owners jumped by 10.7 million. Demand for rental housing 
slowed over the period as the last members of the baby-boom 
generation moved into their peak homebuying years. At the 
same time, rising house prices and lax mortgage underwriting 
standards encouraged many renter households with limited 
resources to make the switch to homeowning. As a result, the 
homeownership rate for all age groups rose and the share of 
renter households declined. 
What little growth in renter households that did occur before 
2005 was due primarily to the rising numbers of minority and 
immigrant households, whose homeownership rates lag those 
of white and native-born households. Indeed, the minority 
share of renter households increased from 37 percent in 1995 
to 43 percent in 2005 (Table A-3). Hispanic renters accounted 
for nearly half of the minority gains, with their numbers up 
34 percent over the decade. The number of black and other 
D E M O G R A P H I C  D R I V E R S 
O F  R E N T A L  D E M A N D 
Notes: White, black and Asian/other are non-Hispanic. Hispanics may be of any race. 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 1995 and 2005 American Housing Surveys, using JCHS-adjusted weights for 2005 data.
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minority renter households rose more modestly, while that of 
white households fell by about 433,000. 
In part, these trends reflect the age structure of the immigrant 
and minority population. These groups are younger on aver-
age than whites because immigrants typically arrive in the 
United States as teenagers and young adults. Among renter 
households with heads aged 39 and under, the number of 
Hispanic renters increased by 775,000 from 1995 to 2005, 
even as the number of same-age white renters fell by 1.7 mil-
lion and the number of black renters declined by 242,000 
(Figure 5). Because of the sheer size of the baby-boom genera-
tion, the number of renter households aged 40 to 59 climbed 
31 percent over this period, lifting the middle-aged share 
of renter households from 27 percent to 32 percent, with 
notable gains for whites and minorities alike. 
THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS
Of the nearly 37 million renter households in 2005, one in 
six (6.1 million) were headed by an immigrant. Most foreign-
born households rent their housing during their first several 
years in this country. For example, among the 1.6 million 
immigrants who had lived in the United States for five years 
or less in 2005, more than 80 percent were renters (Figure 6). 
But like native-born households, many foreign-born house-
holds eventually make the move to homeownership. Indeed, 
the median length of time that immigrants live in the United 
States before buying their first homes is about 11 years, and a 
little longer (14 years) for those who arrive before the age of 
25. As a result, only one-third of the immigrants who came 
to the United States before 1990 remained renters in 2005. 
After being in the country for at least 15 years, the share of 
immigrant households that still rent nearly matches the share 
of same-aged native-born households. 
The decision to own or rent depends on a variety of demo-
graphic factors including income, age, and household com-
position, as well as supply factors such as home prices and 
location. Citizenship also appears to influence this choice, 
given that noncitizens are more than twice as likely as natural-
ized citizens to rent. This gap reflects the limited access that 
foreign-born noncitizens have to mortgage finance, as well as 
their tendency to be younger and to have lived in the United 
States for less time than foreign-born citizens. 
Foreign-born renters also differ from native-born renters in 
significant ways. For example, they are slightly more likely to 
have higher incomes, with only 37 percent of foreign-born 
renters in the bottom income quartile compared with 41 
percent of native-born renters. Immigrants pay higher rents 
on average, largely because they tend to settle in some of the 
nation’s most expensive housing markets. In addition, they 
are far more likely than native-born individuals to live in the 
center cities of metro areas and much less likely to live in more 
affordable rural areas. 
HOUSING MOBILITY AND TENURE CHANGE
Millions of households move in any given year. According 
to a recent Joint Center for Housing Studies analysis, some 
20.4 million—or 19 percent of all households—reported a 
change of residence between 2003 and 2005. While not all 
households switch tenure when they move, many do. Over 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
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this two-year period, 3.6 million renters became homeowners 
and 1.9 million owners became renters (Table A-4). At the same 
time, 4.7 million owners purchased other homes while more 
than 10.2 million renters moved to different rental units. 
In weighing the decision to move, households must assess the 
size, quality, and location of their housing options as well as 
the relative advantages of owning or renting. The transaction 
costs associated with renting a unit—usually just a matter of 
making a deposit—are much more modest than the realtor 
fees, mortgage brokerage costs, and downpayment require-
ments involved in buying a home. As a result, households with 
shorter expected stays are more likely to rent, while house-
holds with longer expected stays are more likely to buy given 
that they can spread the high transaction costs over a longer 
period. Younger households that anticipate major changes in 
education, employment, income, and marital status are there-
fore more apt to rent than otherwise similar households that 
have finished their schooling, settled down, and do not expect 
to move in the near future. 
Because owned units require higher monthly outlays and are 
usually larger and of better quality than rental units, higher-
income renters are more likely than lower-income renters to 
Note: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2003 and 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
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Note: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2003 and 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
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switch to ownership (Figure 7a). Indeed, over one-third of rent-
er households in the top income quartile in 2003 purchased 
homes in the ensuing two years, compared with less than 2.5 
percent of renters in the bottom income quartile. Given the 
long-standing disparity in income and the lingering effects of 
racial discrimination, white renters are twice as likely as black 
renters to make the transition to owning. 
The number of owner households that switch to renting is 
also noteworthy. The reason most of these households cite 
for making such a move is a change in marital status, although 
other family/personal reasons, a new job or job transfer, and 
proximity to work or school are also common motivations. 
Some of these moves, however, are involuntary—especially if 
the owners faced foreclosure. While rising across the country, 
foreclosures appear to be highly concentrated in the lowest-
income and minority communities. Consistent with these 
findings is the fact that homeowners in the bottom income 
quartile were three times more likely than those in the top 
income quartile to switch from owning to renting (Figure 7b). 
Today’s mortgage market woes will not only force many 
owners into the rental market, but also limit the homebuying 
opportunities for other lower-income renters. Another fallout 
from the crisis is the reported increase in renter evictions 
from foreclosed properties owned by absentee landlords and 
financed with subprime loans. At best, the rash of foreclosures 
will increase the number of households searching for rental 
units. At worst, it will add to the ranks of the homeless. 
 
GROWING INCOME INEQUALITY
The income and wealth gap between owners and renters con-
tinues to widen. According to the American Housing Survey, 
median renter income declined by 6 percent in real terms to 
$26,000 from 1995 to 2005, while median owner income 
increased by 8 percent to $55,000. By the end of that decade, 
some 41 percent of renters were in the lowest income quartile 
($21,000 or less), compared with just 17 percent of owners 
(Figure 8). At the other end of the distribution, only 9 percent 
of renters were in the highest income quartile (over $76,000), 
compared with 33 percent of owners. 
The wide income gap reflects in part the steady movement of 
renters—and particularly white renters—into homeownership 
during the decade. Indeed, the number of white renters fell in 
all income quartiles except the lowest. While many minority 
households also bought homes during the boom, the number 
of minority renters in the lowest income quartile increased 
by over one million. In 2005, over 51 percent (3.6 million) 
of black and 39 percent (2.4 million) of Hispanic renters had 
incomes in the bottom income quartile.
The latest available data from the Survey of Consumer Finance 
show that the inequality in wealth holdings of owners and 
renters has also increased. From 1995 to 2004, the surge in 
home prices and unusually favorable mortgage environment 
enabled most owners to accumulate home equity at a rapid 
clip. Over this same period, the median net wealth of owners 
(aggregate value of assets less debts) was up by 44 percent. 
In sharp contrast, the median net wealth of renters fell by 32 
percent (Figure 9). 
Rapid home price appreciation helped to increase the disparity. 
By 2004, homeowners had aggregate net wealth of approxi-
mately $50 trillion, including nearly $12 trillion in home 
equity. Joint Center research indicates that growth in hom-
eowner wealth for highest-income households also reflects 
gains in stocks and other financial assets, funded in part by 
equity cashed out either through home sales or refinancings. 
In contrast, income-constrained owners more typically used 
accumulated home equity to fund daily consumption needs 
rather than savings and investments. As a result, the dispar-
ity in wealth within the ranks of homeowners also grew in 
1995–2004 as the median net wealth of highest-income own-
ers nearly doubled while that of lowest-income owners fell. 
While lowest-quartile renter households did achieve some 
modest gains in net wealth between 1995 and 2004, this cat-
egory includes many households who switched from owning 
to renting and took with them home equity acquired over the 
Note: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
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period of rapid price appreciation. Even so, the median wealth 
holdings of owners in 2004 was 45 times the median wealth 
holdings of renters. 
It is important to note that these net wealth estimates pre-
date the recent housing market turmoil when millions of 
homeowners began to see substantial losses of home equity. 
At this point, it is impossible to predict how long it will take 
for prices to stabilize and then begin to rise again. But even 
in the extremely unlikely case that homeowner wealth returns 
to 1995 levels and renter wealth remains unscathed, median 
homeowner wealth would still be as much as 30 times higher 
than median renter wealth. 
THE OUTLOOK
If foreclosures continue to rise, renter household growth 
could return to levels not seen in a decade. This is already the 
case in those regions and for those groups that have experi-
enced declines in homeownership rates for several years. For 
example, given that foreclosures in the industrial Midwest 
have been climbing since 1996, it stands to reason that renters 
now constitute a growing share of households in that region. 
In fact, the Housing Vacancy Survey indicates that the num-
ber of renter households in the Midwest was up some 10.4 
percent from 2004 to 2007, nearly double the increase in the 
rest of the nation. 
Similarly, the homeownership rate for black households has 
declined more or less steadily since 2004 and growth in 
the number of black renters has accelerated. Now that the 
homeownership rate for whites also appears to be declining 
and that for Hispanics has leveled off, the numbers of renter 
households in these groups are likely to increase as well.
Looking beyond the immediate housing market turmoil, 
there is reason to believe that the growth of renter households 
will again slow early in the next decade. Based on most likely 
assumptions about population growth, household formation 
rates, and continued immigration, the Joint Center estimates 
that demographic factors alone will add 14.6 million house-
holds on net between 2005 and 2015. Growth of this mag-
nitude will not only help to absorb the oversupply in both 
owner and renter markets, but also begin to stabilize housing 
prices and restore gains in homeownership. 
Renter Wealth Lags Far Behind Owner WealthFIGURE 9
Tenure and 
Income Quartile
Median Net Wealth 
(2004 dollars) Percent Change
1995 2004 1995–2004
Owner
Bottom 79,160 75,850 -4.2
Lower Middle 99,473 118,300 18.9
Upper Middle 107,598 161,000 49.6
Top 237,910 453,600 90.7
Total 127,813 184,560 44.4
Renter
Bottom 1,231 1,830 48.7
Lower Middle 6,771 5,400 -20.2
Upper Middle 20,436 19,720 -3.5
Top 62,417 60,500 -3.1
Total 5,934 4,050 -31.7
Notes: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income. Dollar values are 
adjusted for inﬂation by the CPI-UX for all items.
Source: Joint Center tabulations of the 1995 and 2004 Surveys of Consumer Finance.
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Despite a sharp uptick in the number of renter
households, construction of multifamily units for 
rent declined in 2007 for the fifth straight year. Even 
so, growth in the rental inventory has accelerated 
as the excess supply of housing in the for-sale 
market has forced many owners to attempt to rent 
out vacant single-family homes, condos, and vacation 
properties. Although expanding the overall supply, 
these additions are generally higher-quality units that 
provide little relief to the large and growing number 
of low-income renters who struggle to afford even 
marginal housing. This mismatch between supply 
and demand will severely limit the market’s ability 
to absorb the excess rental units sitting empty in 
communities across the country. 
RENTAL CONSTRUCTION SLOWDOWN
Multifamily completions—including both units built for rent 
and condominiums and cooperative apartments built for 
sale—have hovered near 300,000 units annually for much of 
this decade. Building on the strength of the homeownership 
boom, multifamily developers ramped up construction in the 
for-sale market starting in 2004. Completions of multifamily 
units for rent were down to 169,000 units by 2007—the low-
est level since the deep recession of the early 1990s and only 
one-third of the record set in 1986 (Figure 10). 
According to the US Census Bureau, the sharpest cutbacks in 
multifamily rentals have been in the Midwest, where produc-
tion fell to just 19,000 units in 2007—a 60 percent decline 
since 2004. Only the South, a region with relatively rapid 
renter household growth and relatively modest building costs, 
bucked the trend. Rental production in the region did decline 
to 89,000 units in 2007, but this represents only a 20 percent 
drop from the 2004 level.
Multifamily rental production would have fallen even further 
without the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) pro-
gram. Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC 
R E N T A L  P R O D U C T I O N  A N D  S U P P L Y
Source: US Census Bureau, New Residential Construction.
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program provides tax breaks to developers in exchange 
for set-asides of units affordable to lower-income house-
holds. According to the National Council of State Housing 
Agencies, some 75,000 LIHTC units—more than 40 percent 
of total multifamily production—were built in 2006. 
The limited amount of rental construction that is taking place 
today consists primarily of larger apartment buildings. Over 
the period from 1996 through 2005, 1.3 million of the 3.2 
million rentals completed were in structures with 20 or more 
units, and another 1.0 million rentals were in buildings with 
5–19 units. Over the same period, completions of multifamily 
rentals in structures with two to four apartments—historically 
the mainstay of many urban rental markets—totaled about 
200,000, while site-built and manufactured single-family 
homes added another 733,000 (Table A-7). 
The increasing focus on larger structures reflects a variety of 
factors, but the LIHTC program plays a significant role. The 
US Department of Housing and Urban Development reports 
that the average number of units in tax-credit developments 
has steadily risen since the program’s inception and now 
stands at close to 80 units. With tax-credit units accounting 
for increasing shares of all multifamily construction, little 
wonder that large multifamily structures have become the 
fastest-growing segment of the rental housing inventory.
SURGE IN LARGE PROPERTY VALUATIONS
Even as construction of multifamily rentals fell steadily from 
2002 to 2007, investment in large multifamily properties 
accelerated. The combination of record-low interest rates, 
rising occupancy rates, and attractive yields helped to lift sales 
and prices of apartment complexes starting in 2003. Hefty 
increases in net operating income brought in even more inves-
tors, with property prices advancing 50 percent from 2003 to 
2007 (Figure 11).
One of the forces driving investment mid-decade was the 
growing demand for condominiums. In markets across the 
country, the relative affordability of condos and the availabil-
ity of easy financing terms sparked new interest in multifamily 
for-sale units. For buyers, condos provided a means of attain-
ing homeownership in higher-density locations at less cost 
than single-family units. For developers, conversion of multi-
family rental properties into condos was a good alternative to 
the high costs of new construction. Investors bought build-
ings from landlords facing weak rental demand, renovated the 
units, and then sold the condos to individual homebuyers or 
investors seeking a quick profit. 
The run-up in rental property sales was sudden and dramatic. 
Acquisitions by condo converters of multifamily properties sell-
ing for at least $5 million rose ten-fold from 2003 to 2005, to 
more than $30 billion. According to Real Capital Analytics, 
the number of units in these larger rental properties con-
verted to condos expanded from a few thousand in 2003 to 
235,000 in 2005—a figure that exceeds new multifamily rental 
completions in that year. The conversion boom was a distinctly 
regional trend, with over 40 percent of transaction volume in 
2004–2006 located in the Southeast (particularly Florida). 
Source: National Council of Real Estate Invesment Fiduciaries.
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But by the middle of 2006, condo conversions were falling 
out of favor even faster than they had gained it. For the year as 
a whole, acquisitions of multifamily properties for conversion 
to condos dropped to less than $10 billion and the number of 
units converted fell to less than 60,000. By 2007, the market 
for condo conversions had all but disappeared while thou-
sands of units remained in the pipeline. 
The condo boom and bust is not without precedent. From 
1981 to 1985, completions of multifamily units for sale aver-
aged 120,000 units annually. But as the market’s ability to 
absorb this level of production slowed in the second half of 
the decade, some 343,000 units in condo and coop buildings 
reverted to the rental market. 
A similar dynamic appears to be in place. Although current 
condo owners can attempt to rent out their vacant units until 
the for-sale market rebounds, the ability of the rental market 
to absorb a significant share of this excess is questionable. 
The fact that many condominiums are now in the midst of a 
complex foreclosure process adds further uncertainty to the 
timing of the condo market adjustment.
FOCUS ON THE HIGH END
With apartment construction focused increasingly on the high 
end of the market, asking rents have moved up steadily since 
1999. In part, higher asking rents reflect the upward drift 
in the size and quality of multifamily rentals being built. In 
2006, the median size of multifamily rentals set a record of 
1,192 square feet, while the share of apartments with three 
or more bedrooms, air conditioning, and other amenities set 
records as well. 
At the same time, the persistent rise in development costs has 
sharply curtailed the construction of modest-quality, afford-
able rental housing. Although materials such as wood and 
wallboard have become cheaper in recent years, metal prices 
and especially labor costs have climbed. Indeed, average annu-
al cost increases for multifamily construction ranged from -0.1 
percent to 2.2 percent from 1996 to 2003, never exceeding 
the change in general consumer price inflation. From 2004 
to 2006, however, construction costs were up more than 7 
percent annually (more than double the rise in consumer price 
inflation), before dropping back to 3 percent in 2007.
Even more important are soaring land costs. A recent Federal 
Reserve Board study concludes that the price of residential 
land has increased almost 250 percent faster than inflation 
since 1975. Restrictive zoning and land use practices have 
added to the price pressures by limiting the amount of land 
available for multifamily construction, while complex build-
ing requirements have extended construction time. Given the 
reality of rapidly rising land prices, builders increasingly target 
production to high-end consumers or rely on LIHTC or other 
forms of subsidy to help offset high development costs. 
Even allowing for the growing importance of LIHTC units in 
the overall construction mix, the median asking rent for newly 
built apartments in buildings with five or more units never-
theless stood at a record high of $1,057 in 2006—well above 
the $766 median gross rent for all units and up more than 30 
percent from mid-1990s levels. As a result, only 20,000 new 
unfurnished apartments renting for less than $750 a month 
were completed in 2006, despite being the types of units most 
in demand. 
Note: Single-family units include manufactured housing.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
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Although demand for better-quality, higher-priced rentals 
does exist in many metropolitan areas, the annual income 
required to afford (using the 30-percent-of-income standard) 
a monthly rent of $1,057 is $42,280. Given that the median 
renter income in 2006 was just $29,000, most newly built 
units are well beyond the reach of the majority of renters. 
LOSS OF AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING
More than 80 percent of all renters, as well as more than 70 
percent of renters with incomes in the lowest quartile, live in 
privately owned, unsubsidized housing. Unlike newly built 
units, most of the unsubsidized rental stock consists of single-
family residences (including manufactured homes), two- to 
four-family structures, and smaller apartment buildings with 
5–49 units (Figure 12). 
The assisted rental inventory is also predominantly in these 
smaller properties, including units rented by voucher hold-
ers as well as public housing and project-based developments 
located in smaller metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. In 
fact, only one-fifth of assisted rentals are in buildings with 50 
or more units. Larger subsidized properties are typically older 
public housing, project-based developments, or newly built 
LIHTC projects. 
Most of the privately owned, small multifamily rental stock 
was built at least 30 years ago, when construction techniques 
and capital markets were less sophisticated and households 
were less affluent. Much of this inventory is now in need 
of substantial repair. According to the American Housing 
Survey, 3 million private market rental units have severe struc-
tural deficiencies and are at risk of loss. 
From 1995 to 2005, nearly 2.2 million of the 37 million ini-
tially available rental units (occupied and vacant) were demol-
ished or otherwise permanently removed from the inventory. 
Though representing just 6 percent of the 1995 rental stock, 
these losses offset nearly 70 percent of the 3.2 million new 
rental units built over the decade. While occurring across 
all types of properties, losses among single-family and small 
multifamily rentals have been particularly high—in fact more 
than three times those of units in large multifamily buildings 
(Figure 13). Also experiencing high losses are communities with 
large shares of older, lower-quality, and structurally inad-
equate units.
Relative to the low levels of rental construction over this 
period, these losses are even more troubling. Indeed, between 
1995 and 2005, two rental units were permanently removed 
from the inventory for every three units built (Table A-7). 
Inventory losses were highest in the Northeast, where two 
rental units were lost for every one built. In the Midwest, 
construction of 596,000 rental units barely offset removals of 
441,000. Within metropolitan areas, center cities were par-
ticularly hard hit by the rental losses since most new construc-
tion occurs in outlying areas. 
SHIFTS IN MORTGAGE FINANCE
The changing structure of the mortgage industry has had 
a noticeable impact on the multifamily housing market. 
Source: Table A-7.
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During the 1990s, the share of multifamily mortgages that 
were placed in mortgage-backed securities and traded in the 
secondary markets grew steadily. Along with increased stan-
dardization of underwriting criteria and loan documentation, 
these trends created a larger, more stable, and less expensive 
source of capital for rental property owners and developers, 
while also providing greater diversification for investors.
 
At the same time, a dual mortgage delivery system began 
to emerge. Individuals and investors seeking to purchase, 
rehabilitate, or build smaller rental properties were increas-
ingly served by a distinctly different set of mortgage products, 
provided by a distinctly different set of lenders, than those 
financing larger rental properties. The Survey of Residential 
Finance documents that by 2001, some 86 percent of all 
apartment properties with 50 or more units had a mortgage, 
and as many as 65 percent of these properties had a level-
payment, fixed-rate loan. In contrast, only 58 percent of five- 
to nine-unit apartment buildings had a mortgage, and just 
a third had level-payment, fixed-rate mortgages (Figure 14). 
While Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing 
Administration have greatly expanded access to capital for 
one- to four-unit rentals, they draw a distinction between 
owner-occupied and absentee-owner buildings. In 2001, 
less than one-third of all absentee-owned, one- to four-unit 
rental properties had level-payment, fixed-rate financing, 
and over half had no mortgage at all. By way of comparison, 
two out of three owner-occupied, one-to four-unit properties 
had mortgages. 
 
Lacking access to longer-term, level-payment mortgages, 
absentee owners apparently increased their use of higher-risk 
subprime loans to purchase or refinance their small multi-
family properties. According to Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act data, in 2006 higher-risk subprime loans accounted for 
30 percent of first lien home purchase mortgages made to 
nonresident owners of one- to four-unit properties located in 
metropolitan areas. In lower-income minority communities, 
this share approached 50 percent (Table A-8).
Although the data are limited, it appears that foreclosures of 
subprime mortgages on absentee-owned, one- to four-unit 
properties are also on the rise in communities across the 
country, just as they are for owner-occupied housing. Indeed, 
the Mortgage Bankers Association reports that nearly 20 
percent of foreclosures involve these small investment prop-
erties. Foreclosures of rental properties are not only costly 
for the owners, but they also typically lead to the eviction of 
tenants. In addition, foreclosures can undermine the stability 
of already weak neighborhoods by depressing local property 
values, discouraging investment, and attracting crime. 
THE OUTLOOK
The unprecedented turmoil in mortgage and construction 
markets makes the outlook cloudy at best. In its January 2008 
survey of market conditions, the National Multi Housing 
Council reports that executives of apartment-related firms 
were increasingly pessimistic about accessing equity financing 
for new projects and about the prospects for both the multi-
family rental and for-sale markets.
The biggest wildcard is how foreclosures of both single-family 
and small multifamily properties alter the supply of rentals. In 
the short term, these units add to the stock of vacant hous-
ing held off the market as they work their way through the 
complex foreclosure process. In the longer term, because 
many of these foreclosures are in distressed urban markets 
where renters are concentrated, they could well accelerate the 
inventory losses that are already under way. In many urban 
areas, it could take many years to restore stability to rental 
housing markets.
Note: One- to four-unit properties do not include manufactured homes and condominiums.
Source: US Census Bureau, Survey of Residential Finance.
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With so many lower-income renters competing
for the limited supply of affordable housing, 
growing numbers of households find it increasingly 
difficult to make ends meet. To cover even modest 
rents, they must either sacrifice other needs to pay 
for decent housing or live in crowded, inadequate 
conditions in locations that are unsafe, inconvenient, 
or both. Meanwhile, the affordable rental stock 
continues to shrink, placing additional upward 
pressure on rents. Making matters worse, the 
tightening of credit standards in response to the 
foreclosure crisis is adding to the already heavy 
debt burdens of lower-income renters.
GROWING RENT BURDENS
After declines in the 1980s and early 1990s, inflation-adjusted 
gross rents (rents plus utility costs) moved up steadily from 
$704 in 1996 to an all-time high of $775 in 2007. The 
upward drift in rents reflects the fact that even as better-quality 
and higher-rent units are being added to the inventory, older, 
lower-quality, lower-rent units are being lost. From 1995 to 
2005, 1.5 million units renting for less than $600 a month 
in 1995 were demolished or otherwise removed from the 
housing inventory (Figure 15). Of these, some 944,000 rented 
for less than $400. Overall, these losses represent almost 
8 percent of the lower-cost stock.
With losses of this magnitude on top of lagging renter income 
growth, affordability problems have reached unprecedented 
levels. According to the American Community Survey, the 
median gross rent rose 2.7 percent in real terms from 2001 
to 2006 while the median renter income fell by 8.4 percent 
(from over $31,600 to $29,000). As a result, nearly half of 
all renters paid more than 30 percent of their incomes for 
housing in 2006, and about a quarter—nearly nine million 
households—spent more than 50 percent (Table A-6). 
Although the share of renters with such severe cost burdens 
increased in all but the top income group, affordability remains 
a special concern for the nation’s lowest-income renters (with 
annual incomes of $24,200 or less in 2006). Fully 52 percent 
of these renters spent more than half their incomes on hous-
ing in 2006, up from 47 percent in 2001. In absolute terms, 
the number of lowest-income renters with severe cost burdens 
increased by more than one million between 2001 and 2006 to 
surpass the eight-million mark.
Minority households, as well as the youngest and oldest renters, 
are the most likely to face affordability problems. More than 
30 percent of black renters and 27 percent of Hispanic renters 
were severely housing-cost burdened in 2006, compared with 
21 percent of white renters. In addition, 34 percent of renters 
under age 25, along with 32 percent of renters aged 75 and 
over, also paid more than half their incomes for housing. 
A F F O R D A B I L I T Y  C H A L L E N G E S
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 1995 and 2005 American Housing Surveys, using JCHS-adjusted 
weights for 2005 data.
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1995 Rent in 2005 Dollars
$0–399 $400–599 $600–799 $800–999 $1,000+
Twice as Many Low-Cost Rental Units 
Have Been Lost Than of All Other 
Units Combined
Rental Units in 1995 Permanently Removed 
from the Stock by 2005 (Thousands)
FIGURE 15
A M E R I C A ’ S  R E N T A L  H O U S I N G — T H E  K E Y  T O  A  B A L A N C E D  N A T I O N A L  P O L I C Y16
Even the 6.7 million households living in subsidized rental 
housing are not immune to these cost pressures because many 
of today’s subsidized housing programs do not cap rents at 30 
percent of income. American Housing Survey data indicate that 
half of all subsidized renters pay more than 30 percent of their 
incomes for rent, while a quarter pay more than 50 percent. 
Among the subsidized households facing high rent burdens 
are many residents of LIHTC units. To qualify for the tax 
credit, developments must set rents that are affordable to 
households earning 60 percent of area median income. But 
because area median income is based on the incomes of both 
owners and renters, this standard is not as tightly targeted as 
it may first appear. Indeed, in a typical metropolitan area, only 
about one-third of renters can afford a tax-credit unit without 
additional subsidy.
RENTER TRADE-OFFS
While not captured in simple affordability measures, high 
housing costs affect a wide range of consumption choices and 
undermine the quality of life for millions of renter households. 
Rather than pay large shares of their income for housing, 
households may instead choose to live in substandard units, 
double up with friends or relatives in crowded conditions, or 
locate in unsafe or inconvenient neighborhoods. 
Renters are more likely than homeowners to endure such 
poor living conditions. Almost 5 percent of renter households 
live in crowded units while almost 11 percent live in structur-
ally inadequate housing. Comparable shares for homeowners 
are just 1 percent and 3 percent. Moreover, renters are more 
likely than owners to face threats to health and safety in their 
neighborhoods, especially those living in older housing units 
that are located in economically distressed center city neigh-
borhoods. For example, more than 21 percent of renters 
reported crimes in their neighborhoods in 2005, compared 
with 12 percent of owners.
Rather than sacrifice the quality of their housing, some house-
holds pay half or more of their incomes for rent and skimp 
on other expenses. To meet high rents and utility payments, 
these severely cost-burdened renters make difficult trade-offs 
(Table A-5). Those in the bottom expenditure quartile devote 
33 percent less to food, 42 percent less to healthcare, and 
almost 60 percent less to clothing than renters with the same 
total expenses but living in affordable housing (Figure 16). 
While renters with high housing costs spend 74 percent less 
on transportation than those with low housing expenses, this 
trade-off may be no bargain if it means that they are unable 
to access areas where job growth is strongest. Indeed, almost 
60 percent of lowest-income renters do not own cars and thus 
face serious obstacles to seeking jobs in high-growth suburban 
employment centers. While public transit is sometimes an 
option, these systems are generally ill-suited to moving people 
from core areas to widely scattered suburbs. 
Notes: Expenditure quartiles are equal fourths of households sorted by total monthly expenditures. High (low) housing outlays are housing costs that are over 50% (under 30%) of monthly expenditures. 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey, using Quarterly Interview Survey data.
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THE STRUGGLE OF WORKING FAMILIES AND SENIORS
To combat the rising cost of living, the federal minimum wage 
is currently set to increase gradually from today’s $5.85 to 
$7.25 by 2009. Yet even if the full amount were now in effect, 
one minimum-wage job would not pay enough to cover the 
cost of a modest two-bedroom rental unit anywhere in the 
country. According to the latest estimates from the National 
Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), the housing 
wage—or the hourly wage that someone working 40 hours a 
week, 52 weeks a year, would have to earn to cover the cost 
of a modest two-bedroom rental while paying no more than 
30 percent of income for rent—climbed from $16.31 in 2007 
to $17.32 in 2008. 
The shortfall in renter earnings is not for lack of effort. Based 
on an analysis of the 2006 American Community Survey, the 
NLIHC reports that 77 percent of renter households received 
wage and salary income. The shares receiving such income 
increase with household size, from 61 percent for one-person 
households to 92 percent for households with five or more 
persons. Moreover, more than half of all renter households 
with earnings in 2006 reported working more than the stan-
dard 40 hours a week (Figure 17). 
Renter households without wage and salary income are 
typically older or have at least one household member with 
a disability that limits their ability to work. For example, 
single-person households with no wage and salary income 
were seven times more likely to be age 60 and older than 
single-person households with earnings. Similarly, 39 percent 
of two- and three-person households with no wage and sal-
ary income included at least one person age 60 and over, 
compared with only 8.5 percent of same-size households with 
income from earnings. 
Unfortunately for young and old renters alike, even full-time 
employment is no guarantee that a household can afford hous-
ing. Using statewide average fair market rents (FMRs), NLIHC 
estimates that 42.6 percent of all working families did not earn 
enough in 2006 to afford an appropriately sized housing unit. 
Although larger renter households tend to receive higher wage 
and salary income because they have multiple workers, they are 
still unable to cover the relatively higher costs of larger apart-
ment units. As a result, as many as 59 percent of five- and six-
person renter households cannot afford the fair market rent for 
a modest three-bedroom apartment. 
American Community Survey data also indicate that nearly 
2.5 million senior renters (53 percent) pay more than 30 per-
cent of their incomes for housing, while 1.4 million pay more 
than 50 percent. Seniors and others unable to work who have 
basic Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are especially likely 
to face high housing-cost burdens. Universal entitlement still 
leaves these households without sufficient resources to pay 
for rent and utilities as well as for food, medicine, and other 
necessities. Indeed, the basic SSI payment of $623 a month 
is only enough to cover a rent of $191 a month—far below 
the FMR for an efficiency apartment, let alone one with 
a separate bedroom. 
GROWTH OF RENTER DEBT  
Faced with high housing costs that leave little left over for 
other necessities, many renters in the lowest-income quartile 
have to borrow to make ends meet. Indeed, the number of 
lowest-quartile renters in debt grew by 20 percent from 1995 
to 2004, to 7.6 million. For all lowest-income renters, aver-
age outstanding debt was up 62 percent in inflation-adjusted 
terms, from $3,200 to $5,200 (Figure 18). While increasing 
across all age and racial groups, mean debt among renter 
households with heads age 55 and older surged by 76 percent, 
to $8,800. Among minorities, mean debt rose by 61 percent 
to $7,900. 
Despite these growing debt levels, the combination of low 
interest rates and easy credit terms kept minimum monthly 
payments low. According to the 2004 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, the typical lowest-income renter with debt put just 
9 percent of his or her meager income toward debt repayment 
Larger Working Families Face Particularly 
High Housing Cost Burdens
FIGURE 17
Note: FMRs (fair market rents) are HUD estimates of the gross rent for a modest two-bedroom unit in 530 metropolitan 
areas and 2,045 non-metropolitan areas.
Source: National Low Income Housing Coalition tabulations of 2006 American Community Survey.
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Notes: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income. White householders are non-Hispanic, and minority households are all others.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 1995 and 2004 Surveys of Consumer Finances..
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each month, despite having a median debt-to-income ratio of 
almost 40 percent. Payments of this size reduce the cash avail-
able for rent and other necessities, but they are usually insuf-
ficient to cover the accumulating interest on debt, much less 
the principal. By 2004, millions of lowest-income renters were 
caught in a trap as the average number of months required to 
pay off their outstanding balances moved up sharply and their 
debt mounted.
The recent tightening of credit will likely keep the debt bur-
dens of low-income renters on the rise, at least in the near 
term. Financial institutions are already reporting sharp upticks 
in delinquencies on credit cards and auto loans. In conse-
quence, lower-income and less creditworthy borrowers are 
likely to see higher carrying costs on current debt and to have 
limited access to new debt. 
THE OUTLOOK
Housing affordability pressures are expected to increase in the 
near term. With foreclosures forcing owners into the rental 
market and forcing current renters out of their apartments, 
the pressure on the affordable housing inventory is likely to 
drive rents higher. And with energy costs also on the rise, 
gross rents are certain to climb in the year ahead. 
Unfortunately, any improvement in rental affordability will 
not come from the income side of the equation. Renter 
incomes have been stagnant or declining for the last few years, 
and large shares of lowest-income families already work full 
time. If the economy goes into recession, the slowdown in 
employment and wage growth will only make matters worse. 
The rising cost of consumer credit will also take a toll, 
especially on renters that have run up significant debt in 
an attempt to cover basic living expenses. Even for lowest-
income consumers that have managed their credit responsibly 
in the past, stricter credit standards will constrain the options 
for making ends meet in times of unexpected costs or sudden 
loss of income.
Over the longer term, the flood of foreclosed properties onto 
the rental market could ease some of the affordability pres-
sures, but only to the extent that for-sale units converted to 
rentals meet the needs of households in the market. Indeed, 
lowest-income renters may be unable to afford even the highly 
discounted asking rents on foreclosed homes. Moreover, 
given that foreclosures are concentrated in many economically 
distressed urban areas, many low-cost rental properties could 
sit vacant or abandoned for years. 
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Note: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households, sorted by pre-tax income.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS adjusted weights.
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P O L I C Y  D I R E C T I O N S
During the past decade, broader access 
to homeownership emerged as the centerpiece 
of federal, state, and local efforts to expand 
affordable housing opportunities. But just as many 
mortgage brokers and loan officers aggressively 
marketed high-risk mortgage products to vulnerable 
borrowers, many federal, state, and local officials 
also oversold the benefits of homeownership—
especially to low-income and low-wealth households. 
The recent rise in mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures has now exposed the tragic flaw 
in this single-minded strategy. 
Undoubtedly most Americans share the goal of becoming 
homeowners. Yet for many families, securing access to decent 
and affordable housing of any sort is even more important. What 
is needed is a more balanced set of policies that would expand 
affordable housing in both the for-rent and for-sale markets. 
Ironically, as the nation struggles against the fallout from the 
mortgage crisis, now is a good time to develop initiatives that 
would transform the large inventory of foreclosed properties 
into the next generation of affordable rental housing.
FALLING SHORT OF NEED
At current funding levels, federal, state, and local programs 
serve only a fraction of the nation’s lowest-income families 
in desperate need. Following a rapid buildup from 1977 to 
1987, growth in the number of households receiving direct 
assistance (public housing, housing choice vouchers, and 
project-based units) slowed dramatically. While the recent 
addition of thousands of tax-credit units helps matters, low-
est-income renters often require a housing voucher to afford 
the rents in these units. 
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Recognizing that housing assistance is not an entitlement pro-
gram, Congress has attempted to target families most in need. 
Lack of available assisted units, however, makes this difficult. 
While estimates vary, the 2005 American Housing Survey 
suggests that only one in five (or 6.7 million) of all renters 
live in assisted housing. Even among elderly renters in the 
lowest income quartile, less than four in ten receive housing 
assistance (Figure 19).
PRESERVING AFFORDABLE UNITS
Even as new subsidized units are added—albeit slowly—to the 
affordable housing inventory, older subsidized units are being 
lost. Beginning in the late 1980s, some owners of project-
based housing were able to remove their properties from 
the HUD-assisted inventory by prepaying their mortgages. 
In the mid-1990s, the trickle became a flow as the Section 8 
contracts themselves began to expire and many owners opted 
out of the program. 
Today large segments of the assisted inventory are at risk. The 
Government Accountability Office estimates that mortgage 
restrictions and rental assistance contracts on over one million 
subsidized units are set to expire by 2013. Efforts to encour-
age or force owners of assisted properties to keep their units 
affordable are under way, but limited funding again hampers 
any widespread or permanent solution.
At the same time, much of the unsubsidized but low-cost 
rental inventory is being lost to abandonment and demolition, 
and now to foreclosure. Since developing new affordable rent-
al housing remains difficult without steep subsidy, preserving 
whatever low-cost units remain should be an urgent priority. 
The success of preservation efforts depends in large measure 
on the willingness of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds 
to renew expiring project-based contracts and fund additional 
efforts to slow the loss of privately owned low-cost rentals. 
Without new affordable housing initiatives and expanded 
funding to bring these initiatives to scale, the affordable rental 
inventory will continue to shrink. 
REMOVING BARRIERS TO DEVELOPMENT
In addition to limited federal support, local regulations also 
contribute to the lack of affordable housing development. 
While an isolated few municipalities have taken steps to 
reduce or refine such regulations, many others are becoming 
more restrictive, either overtly or covertly. In many markets, 
zoning restrictions, minimum lot sizes, lengthy permitting 
and approval processes, and voter opposition to specific kinds 
of developments make the construction of affordable rental 
housing more difficult and therefore more expensive.
Predictably, the most restrictive municipalities have the largest 
shares of cost-burdened renter households. Just as predict-
ably, low-income renters cluster in the least expensive—and 
often the least desirable—areas of metropolitan regions. 
Among all metro area households, renters are nearly twice as 
likely as owners to live in center city locations. The shares of 
low-income minority renters are even higher (Figure 20). 
Notes: Low-income households are in the bottom fourth of all households sorted by pre-tax income. White householders are non-Hispanic, and minority households are all others.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2005 American Housing Survey, using JCHS-adjusted weights and AHS metro deﬁnitions.
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The concentration of lowest-income renters reflects in part 
the availability of assisted housing, particularly public hous-
ing. As a proportion of the metropolitan area total, over 60 
percent of low-income minority renters and nearly 70 percent 
of assisted minority renters live in center cities. 
The clustering of lowest-income and assisted renter house-
holds imposes a host of social and economic disadvantages on 
these groups. Among other impacts, these settlement patterns 
reinforce the spatial isolation of the poor, foster racial segre-
gation, discourage investment in lower-income communities, 
and contribute to higher rates of crime, teen pregnancy, and 
school dropouts. At the same time, the lack of affordable rent-
al housing options in job-rich environments limits the ability 
of lower-income families to work their way out of poverty.
FORECLOSURES IN BOTH HOT AND COLD MARKETS 
On top of the persistent problems of growing income inequal-
ity, concentration of poverty, and ongoing loss of affordable 
units, the rental market disruption linked to the subprime 
mortgage foreclosure crisis continues to gather steam. With 
serious delinquencies at record levels, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association estimates that some 936,000 home mortgages 
were in foreclosure at the end of 2007. As high as this number 
is, it includes neither foreclosure actions that were completed 
earlier in the year nor the hundreds of thousands of delin-
quent loans that are likely to enter foreclosure in the months 
and years ahead.
Although the mortgage market meltdown only emerged as 
the dominant national housing policy issue in 2007, problems 
were already well entrenched in the economically distressed 
states of the Midwest (Figure 21). Reflecting the ongoing loss of 
manufacturing jobs, serious mortgage delinquencies and fore-
closures have been on the rise in Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana 
for more than 10 years. Particularly hard hit are the center 
cities and the urban neighborhoods that are home to many of 
the region’s lowest-income and/or minority renters.
Share of Loans 
in Foreclosure 
■ Under 1.0%
■ 1.0–1.9%
■  2.0–2.9%
■  3.0% and Over 
Note: Data are not seasonally adjusted.
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.
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Share of Loans in Foreclosure, Year-End 2007 (Percent)
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The recent surge in delinquencies and foreclosures in hot 
housing markets such as California, Nevada, and Florida—
with otherwise solid income, employment, and household 
growth—turned a regional problem into a national one. 
In these states where home prices had skyrocketed, lenders 
aggressively marketed a set of exotic mortgage products with 
affordability (interest-only and payment-option) features or 
adjustable-rate structures with steep initial discounts. Like 
earlier forms of subprime mortgages, these new loan products 
rapidly gained market share. 
Even though rising home prices added to affordability pres-
sures in these booming housing markets, they also boosted 
homeowners’ equity. Together with increasingly favorable 
financing terms, this significant equity buildup helped many 
overextended homeowners meet their mortgage payments 
simply by refinancing. For households whose incomes were 
growing with the overall economy, this made considerable 
financial sense and homeowners accumulated substantial 
equity by doing so. 
But for others with weaker income growth, mortgage pay-
ments quickly became unmanageable. When house price 
appreciation eventually slowed, a growing number of house-
holds were stretched to the limit—unable to afford their 
current mortgages or to cover the shortfall by refinancing. 
The result was a sudden and dramatic jump in the number 
of seriously delinquent loans, as well as in the number of 
homeowners facing foreclosure. 
TOWARD A BALANCED NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY
With foreclosures on the rise across the country, national 
attention rightfully focuses on efforts to help owners caught 
in the crossfire of the mortgage market meltdown. At the 
same time, it is important not to lose sight of what this hous-
ing downturn means for the rental market. Since higher-risk 
subprime loans are concentrated in low-income and minority 
communities, the fallout from foreclosures hits hardest in the 
areas where many of the nation’s most economically vulnerable 
renters live. 
Moreover, to the extent that mortgage market troubles have 
spilled over into the broader housing capital market, today’s 
crisis will further limit the construction of affordable rental 
housing and add to the costs of preserving the existing lower-
cost inventory. Against the backdrop of long-standing rental 
affordability problems and with an economic slowdown under 
way, now is a good time to rethink efforts to insure that all 
households—owners and renters alike—have access to decent 
and affordable housing.
For millions of American households, the overwhelming 
problem is not simply high housing costs, but limited income. 
The current focus on promoting homeownership clearly has 
a downside when a move from renting to owning involves 
swapping an unmanageable rent burden for an unmanageable 
mortgage burden. While many lower-income households are 
able to meet the high payment burdens of homeownership, 
many cannot. Indeed, the Homeownership Preservation 
Foundation reports that of the more than 80,000 distressed 
borrowers counseled in 2007, approximately 70 percent had 
incomes that were below the national median. 
Although large shares of lowest-income renters face either 
moderate or severe housing cost burdens, over 60 percent of 
lowest-income homeowners also pay more than 30 percent of 
their meager incomes for housing (Figure 22). More than 40 
percent pay more than half. Moreover, owner households in 
the lower-middle income quartile are more likely to face high 
housing cost burdens than renters with similar incomes.
Now that large numbers of former owners are flooding back 
into rental markets, expanding the available supply of afford-
able rentals is critical. While efforts to create new units must 
continue, preserving the existing stock of good-quality, sub-
sidized rental housing is even more important. In addition, 
recognizing that the vast majority of lowest-income renters 
do not live in assisted housing, it is also time to craft new 
programs to preserve the rapidly dwindling supply of privately 
owned unsubsidized rentals. 
To accomplish these goals, efforts must continue to eliminate 
land use policies that limit development of affordable, higher-
density rental housing in resource-rich suburban communities. 
Although regulatory reform is difficult to achieve, national 
housing policy must confront political opposition head on. 
Simply put, land use restrictions not only deter production 
of affordable housing, but they also promote land-intensive 
development that raises housing prices and imposes costs on 
all households, whether rich or poor, owner or renter. 
Comprehensive housing assistance programs must also improve 
access to critical health and human services, child care, trans-
portation, and other workforce development initiatives so that 
low-income and low-wealth families are able to earn decent 
incomes. This might involve the construction of service-
enriched affordable rental housing in suburban communities 
as well as in inner-city neighborhoods. In this way, a balanced 
national policy would not only expand the range of available 
rental housing options, but also underpin the revitalization 
of distressed areas.
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Finally, access to capital is needed to support the acquisition 
and preservation of single-family rentals and smaller apart-
ment buildings, including foreclosed properties now coming 
back on the market. On the financing side, one strategy would 
be to perfect pooled approaches to acquire several properties 
with a single financial transaction. On the equity side, new 
types of real estate investment trusts could be designed to 
raise capital from private investors to invest in smaller apart-
ment projects. This funding would breathe new life back into 
the stock of older multifamily properties, which are such a 
crucial component of the affordable rental housing supply in 
many communities. 
In today’s soft housing market, it would also be possible to 
expand on this concept. As the volume of foreclosed proper-
ties mounts, many holders of these assets will be forced to 
sell at deep discounts. This creates an opportunity for well-
capitalized players to purchase and manage distressed portfo-
lios for a profit. What is needed is a mission-driven entity—a 
community preservation fund—that could participate in this 
market but with the goal of creating affordable housing and 
stable communities rather than simply maximizing profits. 
With skill and foresight, the nation could capture a significant 
share of good-quality housing at today’s depressed prices to 
create the next generation of affordable rental housing. 
A well-designed program would help lower-income owners as 
well as renters. For example, a publicly oriented venture could 
offer more generous workout terms than presently available 
in the market and, in doing so, allow distressed borrowers 
more time to recover. Alternatively, rather than sell off fore-
closed properties for the highest private return, the new entity 
might support a broader definition of social gain—including 
enhanced neighborhood stability and expanded access to 
affordable and sustainable homeownership opportunities. 
This approach is not without risk. Managed with too much 
heart and too little head, this new enterprise could put mil-
lions of dollars at risk for only limited gain. But funded by 
some blend of public, CRA-motivated, and market-rate 
resources, along with earnings from the sale of performing 
loans and foreclosed assets, this new venture could also usher 
in a new era in public–private partnerships, and with it, a more 
balanced national housing policy.
Notes: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income. Severely (moderately) burdened households are deﬁned as paying more than 50% (30–50%) of income for housing.
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2006 American Community Survey.
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Table A-1 Rental Housing Market Indicators, 1975–2007
Table A-2 Renter Income and Housing Costs, 1975–2007 
Table A-3  Characteristics of Renter Households by Race/Ethnicity, 
1995 and 2005
Table A-4  Recent Mover Households by Prior Tenure, 2005
Table A-5 Average Monthly Expenditures for Renters, 2005
Table A-6  Households by Tenure, Income, and Housing Cost Burdens, 
2001 and 2006
Table A-7 Rental Completions and Inventory Losses, 1995–2005
Table A-8  First Lien Mortgages on One- to Four-Unit Properties 
by Owner and Neighborhood Characteristics, 2006
A P P E N D I X  T A B L E S
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Year
Multifamily 
Permits 1 
 Multifamily 
Starts 2 
Multifamily 
Completions3
Size of New 
Multifamily 
For-Rent Units4
Residential Upkeep 
and Improvement of 
Rental Properties5
Rental 
Vacancy 
Rates6
Value Put 
in Place:
Multifamily 
Units7
(000s) (000s)
For Sale
(000s)
For Rent
(000s) (Median sq. ft.)
(Millions of 2007 
dollars) (Percent)
 (Millions of 
2007 dollars)
1975 264 268  121  321 942 32,852 6.0 25,735
1976 403 375  75  268 894 32,075 5.6 25,175
1977 564 536  77  322 881 28,499 5.2 34,266
1978 618 587  91  408 863 35,502 5.0 40,799
1979 570 551  135  434 893 34,436 5.4 48,584
1980 480 440  174  371 915 30,750 5.4 42,034
1981 421 379  164  283 930 32,190 5.0 39,818
1982 454 400  148  226 925 29,022 5.3 33,379
1983 704 635  152  314 893 31,089 5.7 46,720
1984 759 665  197  430 871 47,525 5.9 56,306
1985 777 669  184  447 882 59,323 6.5 54,983
1986 692 626  133  503 876 67,259 7.3 58,706
1987 510 474  134  412 920 70,551 7.7 46,445
1988 462 407  117  329 940 68,358 7.7 39,073
1989 407 373  90  307 940 70,313 7.4 37,287
1990 317 298  76  266 955 76,387 7.2 30,532
1991 195 174  56  197 980 62,335 7.4 23,056
1992 184 170  44  150 985 58,931 7.4 19,347
1993 213 162  44  109 1,005 60,395 7.3 15,476
1994 303 259  49  138 1,015 55,909 7.4 19,696
1995 335 278  51  196 1,040 55,851 7.6 24,333
1996 356 316  50  234 1,030 56,588 7.8 26,853
1997 379 340  54  230 1,050 51,166 7.7 29,555
1998 425 346  55  260 1,020 43,613 7.9 31,253
1999 417 339  55  279 1,054 54,275 8.1 34,136
2000 394 338  60  272 1,091 58,256 8.0 34,019
2001 401 329  75  240 1,094 56,329 8.4 35,473
2002 415 346  63  260 1,092 59,710 8.9 37,520
2003 428 349  56  236 1,108 64,194 9.8 39,563
2004 457 345  72  238 1,159 60,493 10.2 43,835
2005 473 353  97  199 1,180 51,728 9.8 50,203
2006 461 336  127  198 1,192 51,960 9.7 54,519
2007 407 309 116 169 1,138 50,845 9.8 49,149 
Rental Housing Market Indicators, 1975–2007Table A-1
Note: All value series are deflated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI-UX) for All Items. Web links confirmed as of April 2008.  
Sources:  1. US Census Bureau, Construction Statistics, New Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, www.census.gov/pub/const/bpann.pdf.
 2. US Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units Started, www.census.gov/const/startsan.pdf.
 3. US Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units Completed in the United States, by Purpose and Design, www.census.gov/const/compsusintenta.pdf.
 4. US Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units Started in the United States, by Purpose and Design, www.census.gov/const/startsusintenta.pdf.
 5. US Census Bureau, Expenditures by Region and Property Type, www.census.gov/const/C50/histtab2new.pdf.
 6. US Census Bureau, Housing Vacancy Survey. 
 7. US Census Bureau, Annual Value of Private Construction Put in Place, www.census.gov/const/C30/private.pdf.
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Renter Income and Housing Costs, 1975–2007
2007 Dollars
Table A-2
Notes and Sources:  All dollar amounts are expressed in 2007 constant dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI-UX) for All Items. 
Renter median incomes through 2006 are from Current Population Survey P60 published reports. Renters exclude those paying no cash rent. Income for 2007 is based 
on Moody’s Economy.com estimate for all households, adjusted by the three-year average ratio of CPS renter incomes to all household incomes. Contract rent equals 
median 2005 contract rent from the American Housing Survey, indexed by the CPI residential rent index with adjustments for depreciation in the stock before 1987. 
Gross rent is equal to contract rent plus fuel and utilities. Asking rent is for newly completed, privately financed, unsubsidized unfurnished rental apartments in 
structures of five or more units. Annual asking rent for 2007 is the average of the first and second quarters.     
 
Yea r
Monthly Income and Housing Costs Housing Cost as Share of Income (%)
Renter 
Incomes
Contract 
Rent
Gross 
Rent
Asking 
Rent
Contract 
Rent
Gross 
Rent
Asking 
Rent
1975 2,779 654 708 813 23.5 25.5 29.3
1976 2,697 654 710 798 24.2 26.3 29.6
1977 2,714 653 712 794 24.0 26.2 29.2
1978 2,750 651 711 798 23.7 25.9 29.0
1979 2,691 629 688 777 23.4 25.6 28.9
1980 2,551 605 666 775 23.7 26.1 30.4
1981 2,517 597 660 792 23.7 26.2 31.4
1982 2,542 607 675 827 23.9 26.5 32.5
1983 2,536 625 696 804 24.6 27.4 31.7
1984 2,614 632 703 784 24.2 26.9 30.0
1985 2,652 650 720 832 24.5 27.1 31.4
1986 2,683 677 745 865 25.2 27.8 32.2
1987 2,657 680 745 944 25.6 28.0 35.5
1988 2,737 678 741 964 24.8 27.1 35.2
1989 2,828 672 734 987 23.8 25.9 34.9
1990 2,739 664 724 952 24.3 26.4 34.8
1991 2,625 660 719 935 25.1 27.4 35.6
1992 2,553 657 716 866 25.7 28.0 33.9
1993 2,526 653 712 822 25.8 28.2 32.5
1994 2,493 652 710 806 26.2 28.5 32.3
1995 2,558 650 706 891 25.4 27.6 34.8
1996 2,580 648 704 888 25.1 27.3 34.4
1997 2,639 652 708 935 24.7 26.8 35.4
1998 2,691 662 717 934 24.6 26.6 34.7
1999 2,788 668 722 984 24.0 25.9 35.3
2000 2,805 670 724 1,013 23.9 25.8 36.1
2001 2,781 681 739 1,031 24.5 26.6 37.1
2002 2,677 696 751 1,058 26.0 28.1 39.5
2003 2,588 701 758 1,049 27.1 29.3 40.5
2004 2,551 701 759 1,071 27.5 29.7 42.0
2005 2,568 698 760 1,000 27.2 29.6 38.9
2006 2,639 701 766 1,057 26.5 29.0 40.1
2007 2,615 710 775 982 27.2 29.6 37.5
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Characteristics of Renter Households by Race/Ethnicity, 1995 and 2005
Thousands
Table A-3
1995 2005
White Black Asian/Other Hispanic All Renters White Black Asian/Other Hispanic All Renters 
Total 21,530 6,502 1,606 4,512 34,150 21,096 7,004 1,993 6,065 36,776
Family Type
Married without Children 3,136 383 241 524 4,284 2,576 443 357 731 4,174
Married with Childen 3,263 766 424 1,279 5,732 2,654 591 457 1,641 5,417
Single Parent 2,693 2,054 220 1,042 6,008 2,588 1,993 203 1,299 6,197
Other Family 1,155 773 156 463 2,547 1,203 842 213 687 2,990
Single Person 8,783 2,118 427 864 12,192 9,424 2,750 592 1,183 14,180
Other Non-Family 2,500 408 137 341 3,386 2,650 385 171 524 3,817
Age
Under 20 251 71 26 77 424 443 143 40 98 746
20–29 5,884 1,670 453 1,347 9,355 5,535 1,579 480 1,723 9,482
30–39 5,785 1,934 512 1,411 9,642 4,235 1,709 575 1,789 8,468
40–49 3,555 1,380 302 756 5,992 3,827 1,577 407 1,211 7,129
50–59 1,895 619 164 409 3,086 2,755 1,025 227 632 4,729
60–69 1,390 397 72 274 2,133 1,588 509 122 324 2,585
70 and Over 2,770 432 77 239 3,518 2,713 461 142 288 3,638
Income Quartile
Bottom 7,179 3,348 582 1,972 13,082 7,982 3,581 685 2,385 14,897
Lower Middle 6,744 1,814 439 1,450 10,448 6,607 2,186 542 2,142 11,661
Upper Middle 5,147 1,047 365 810 7,369 4,336 884 480 1,135 6,923
Top 2,459 293 220 279 3,251 2,172 352 286 403 3,296
Notes: Household counts from 2005 exclude multirace, which was not a reported category in the 1995 data. Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households, sorted 
by pre-tax income. Black, white and Asian/other householders are non-Hispanic, and Hispanic householders may be of any race. Asian/other includes Pacific Islanders, 
Native Americans and Aleuts. 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 1995 and 2005 American Housing Surveys, using JCHS-adjusted weights in 2005.
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Recent Mover Households by Prior Tenure, 2005
Thousands
Table A-4
Owner Households in 2003 Renter Households in 2003
Total Renters in 2005 Percent Total Owners in 2005 Percent
Total 72,424 1,876 2.6 36,004 3,576 9.9
Marital Status
Married 46,495 692 1.5 10,716 1,991 18.6
Widowed 8,678 220 2.5 3,175 48 1.5
Divorced/Separated 10,477 730 7.0 9,071 560 6.2
Never Married 6,774 234 3.5 13,042 977 7.5
Family Type
Married without Children 26,049 305 1.2 4,196 880 21.0
Married with Children 19,540 312 1.6 5,486 1,057 19.3
Single Parent 4,110 270 6.6 5,889 346 5.9
Other Family 4,857 105 2.2 2,910 173 6.0
Single Person 15,310 744 4.9 13,753 795 5.8
Other Non-Family 2,558 139 5.4 3,770 326 8.7
Age
Under 20 77 17 22.1 511 11 2.2
20–29 4,184 227 5.4 9,693 1,093 11.3
30–39 12,521 438 3.5 8,724 1,149 13.2
40–49 17,404 453 2.6 6,877 784 11.4
50–59 15,240 312 2.0 4,295 417 9.7
60–69 10,477 170 1.6 2,385 91 3.8
70 and Over 12,520 258 2.1 3,520 31 0.9
Race/Ethnicity
White 58,336 1,431 2.5 21,103 2,439 11.6
Black 5,816 151 2.6 6,686 362 5.4
Hispanic 5,104 165 3.2 5,685 512 9.0
Asian 2,534 65 2.6 1,995 209 10.5
Multirace 634 64 10.1 535 55 10.3
All Minority 14,088 445 3.2 14,901 1,138 7.6
Income Quartile
Bottom 12,905 509 3.9 14,506 332 2.3
Lower Middle 16,052 610 3.8 11,225 769 6.8
Upper Middle 19,833 454 2.3 7,188 1,320 18.4
Top 23,634 303 1.3 3,086 1,156 37.5
Notes: Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households, sorted by pre-tax income. Black, white and Asian/other householders are non-Hispanic, and Hispanic 
householders may be of any race. 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2003 and 2005 American Housing Surveys, using JCHS-adjusted weights.
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Average Monthly Expenditures for Renters, 2005
2005 Dollars
Table A-5
Note: Expenditure quartiles are equal fourths of households sorted by total monthly expenditures. 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the Consumer Expenditure Survey, using Quarterly Interview Survey data for calendar year 2005. 
Expenditure Quartiles and 
Share of Expenditures on Housing Housing Transportation Food Clothes Healthcare
Personal Insurance 
and Pensions Entertainment Other
Bottom
Less than 30% 209 173 286 45 50 80 52 189
30–50% 465 117 250 32 54 83 42 131
More than 50% 646 45 184 19 29 48 24 72
All 428 117 245 33 46 73 40 135
Lower Middle
Less than 30% 499 449 439 96 103 232 110 418
30–50% 852 301 389 68 76 218 82 247
More than 50% 1,397 128 280 34 74 130 48 132
All 754 348 400 77 88 215 90 310
Upper Middle
Less than 30% 751 732 569 152 179 402 176 678
30–50% 1,260 493 540 103 125 374 128 423
More than 50% 2,088 227 399 77 161 232 77 279
All 971 636 551 134 163 385 156 583
Top
Less than 30% 1,113 1,231 821 248 346 717 345 1,594
30–50% 2,119 705 779 157 215 712 220 805
More than 50% 4,515 491 637 144 187 494 122 695
All 1,364 1,116 810 229 318 712 317 1,424
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Households by Tenure, Income, and Housing Cost Burdens, 2001 and 2006
Thousands
Table A-6
Tenure and 
Income Quartile
2001 2006
No 
Burden
Moderate 
Burden
Severe 
Burden Total
No
 Burden
Moderate 
Burden
Severe 
Burden Total
All Households
Bottom 8,769 6,511 11,328 26,609 8,036 6,620 13,247 27,904
Lower Middle 18,393 6,340 1,876 26,609 17,253 7,590 3,061 27,904
Upper Middle 22,786 3,319 504 26,609 22,085 4,751 1,068 27,904
Top 25,191 1,280 138 26,609 25,318 2,294 293 27,904
Total 75,140 17,450 13,846 106,436 72,692 21,256 17,669 111,617
Owners
Bottom 5,065 2,549 4,428 12,042 4,507 2,654 5,168 12,329
Lower Middle 10,695 3,630 1,456 15,781 10,390 4,358 2,346 17,094
Upper Middle 16,015 2,882 465 19,362 15,923 4,110 1,002 21,035
Top 21,457 1,208 137 22,802 22,103 2,222 292 24,616
Total 53,231 10,270 6,485 69,986 52,924 13,343 8,808 75,075
Renters
Bottom 3,705 3,962 6,901 14,567 3,529 3,967 8,079 15,575
Lower Middle 7,698 2,710 419 10,828 6,862 3,232 716 10,810
Upper Middle 6,771 437 39 7,247 6,162 641 65 6,869
Top 3,735 71 2 3,807 3,215 72 1 3,288
Total 21,908 7,180 7,361 36,449 19,769 7,912 8,861 36,542
Notes:  Income quartiles are equal fourths of all households sorted by pre-tax income. Moderate (severe) burdens are defined as housing costs of 30–50% (over 50%) 
of household income. 
Source: JCHS tabulations of the 2001 and 2006 American Community Surveys.
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Rental Completions and Inventory Losses, 1995–2005Table A-7
Characteristics 
in 1995
Rental Units in 1995 
(000s)
Units Lost from 
Stock by 2005 
(000s)
Loss Rate 
(%)
Completions 
1996–2005 
(000s)
Replacement Rate 
(%)
All Rental Units 36,815 2,183 5.9 3,183 145.8
Structure Type
Single-Family 11,857 708 6.0 386 54.5
2–4 Units 8,196 664 8.1 206 31.0
5–9 Units 4,674 215 4.6 347 161.4
10–19 Units 4,343 154 3.5 645 418.8
20–49 Units 3,150 76 2.4 812 1,068.4
50 Units and Over 3,144 72 2.3 440 611.1
Manufactured Homes 1,452 294 20.2 347 118.0
Region
Northeast 7,821 455 5.8 234 51.4
Midwest 7,651 441 5.8 596 135.1
South 12,299 911 7.4 1,608 176.5
West 9,044 377 4.2 743 197.1
Gross Rent (2005 $)
Less than $400 8,597 944 11.0 NA NA
$400 to $599 9,852 538 5.5 NA NA
$600 to $799 8,504 292 3.4 NA NA
$800 to $1,000 4,538 115 2.5 NA NA
$1,000 and Over 3,914 110 2.8 NA NA
Notes: Gross rents are in 2005 dollars. Loss rates are defined as share of all units in 1995 that were reported as a Type C Non-Interview (permanent removal from 
the stock) in 2005. Replacement rate is defined as housing units completed as a percent of inventory losses. NA is not available.
Sources: US Census Bureau, “New Privately Owned Housing Units Completed in the United States By Intent and Design,” and Joint Center tabulations 
of the 1995 and 2005 American Housing Surveys, using JCHS-adjusted weights for 2005.
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First Lien Mortgages on One- to Four-Unit Properties by Owner and Neighborhood Characteristics, 2006Table A-8
For Purchase For Refinance All
 High Cost  High Cost  High Cost
Total Number 
(000s)
Number
(000s)
Share
(%)
Total Number 
(000s)
Number
(000s)
Share
(%)
Total Number 
(000s)
Number
(000s)
Share
(%)
Owner Occupied
All 3,833 888 23.2 3,892 1,161 29.8 7,726 2,049 26.5
Low Income 
White 55 15 27.4 62 23 37.2 117 38 32.6
Mixed 231 70 30.1 226 85 37.5 457 154 33.7
Minority 360 158 43.9 462 207 44.9 822 365 44.4
Middle Income
White 594 108 18.3 622 175 28.1 1,215 283 23.3
Mixed 980 230 23.5 946 284 30.0 1,926 514 26.7
Minority 266 104 38.9 376 138 36.6 642 241 37.6
High Income
White 484 53 10.9 418 81 19.4 902 134 14.8
Mixed 775 124 15.9 671 139 20.7 1,446 262 18.1
Minority 89 27 30.6 110 30 27.1 198 57 28.7
Non-Resident Owned
All 717 211 29.4 455 136 29.9 1,172 347 29.6
Low Income 
White 13 4 31.3 9 3 29.9 22 7 30.7
Mixed 74 25 33.8 49 15 31.3 123 40 32.8
Minority 110 54 48.7 102 44 43.5 212 98 46.2
Middle Income
White 98 22 22.7 55 13 24.1 152 35 23.2
Mixed 194 52 26.9 106 27 25.6 300 79 26.4
Minority 43 17 38.5 38 13 34.9 81 30 36.8
High Income
White 66 12 17.5 32 6 18.5 98 17 17.8
Mixed 109 23 20.7 55 11 20.9 163 34 20.8
Minority 12 3 29.1 8 2 27.0 20 6 28.2
Notes: Low- (middle-/high-) income neighborhoods are defined as census tracts with less than 80% (80–120%/more than 120%) of the MSA/MD median income. 
Minority neighborhoods are more than 50% minority; mixed neighborhoods are 10–50% minority; and white neighborhoods are less than 10% minority.
Source: Joint Center tabulations of 2006 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data.
Prepared by the Joint Center for Housing Studies 
of Harvard University
Barbara Alexander
William Apgar
Kermit Baker
Pamela Baldwin
Eric Belsky
Zhu Xiao Di
Rachel Bogardus Drew
Elizabeth England
Ren Essene
Gary Fauth
Angela Flynn
Jackie Hernandez
Nancy Jennings
George Masnick
Dan McCue
John Meyer
Meg Nipson
Kevin Park
Nicolas Retsinas
Laurel Trayes
Alexander von Hoffman
For additional copies, please contact 
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University
1033 Massachusetts Avenue, 5th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02138
www.jchs.harvard.edu
Joint Center for Housing Studies 
of Harvard University
1033 Massachusetts Avenue, 5th Floor 
Cambridge, MA  02138
 p  617 495 7908
 f  617 496 9957
www.jchs.harvard.edu
